Recent empirical evidence suggests that product creation is procyclical and it occurs largely within existing …rms. Motivated by these …ndings, the current paper investigates the role of intra-…rm product scope choice in a general equilibrium economy with oligopolistic producers. We show that the multi-product nature of …rms makes the economy signi…cantly more susceptible to sunspot equilibria. The estimated indeterminate model generates arti…cial business cycles that closely resemble empirically observed ‡uctuations.
Introduction
This paper explores a model of business cycles in which product creation and …rm dynamics generate soi-disant sunspot equilibria which ultimately drive movements in the economy's real output. It builds on a growing body of empirical work that suggests that a large portion of …rms are multi-product producers. Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010), for example, report that close to half of US manufacturing …rms produce in multiple 5-digit SIC industries. The importance of this …nding becomes apparent once noticing that these …rms account for about 90 percent of total sales. Broda and Weinstein (2010) arrive at similar conclusions. In particular, they document that over 90 percent of product creation and destruction occurs within …rms (i.e. as …rms adjust their product scopes). This alludes that the contribution to aggregate output from product scope variations is at least as important as that from net business formation.
The current paper picks up on these observations by laying out an arti…-cial economy that generates procyclical product creation within …rms, while also giving rise to endogenous business cycles. Speci…cally, we investigate the roles of net product creation and net business formation in a general equilibrium economy with oligopolistic intermediate goods …rms. Endogenous net product creation (in particular via changes in …rms'product scopes) creates sunspot equilibria at very realistic parametric situations. To demonstrate this, we estimate the indeterminate model and show that a combination of both belief shocks (i.e. sunspots) and fundamental shocks generates arti…cial business cycles that resemble empirically observed ‡uctuations.
Indeterminacy arises in the economy because net business formation and …rms' product scope choice a¤ect labor demand. The two e¤ects lead to e¢ ciency gains; phrased alternatively, net product creation gives rise to an endogenously shifting e¢ ciency wedge. Furthermore, the oligopolistic market structure leads to countercyclical markups that act as an additional shifter of production possibilities -as a consequence, the wage-hours locus becomes upwardly sloping. Intuitively, sunspots come into e¤ect as follows. Assume that people feel more optimistic about the future path of income: a wealth e¤ect that causes a rise in the demands for consumption and leisure. Labor supply shifts inwards along an upwardly sloping wage-hours locus, thereby raising employment and output, and subsequently allowing the initial expec-tations of higher incomes to become self-ful…lling. 1 Our arti…cial economy parallels Feenstra and Ma (2009) and Minniti and Turino (2013) who introduce multi-product …rms into general equilibrium. While also studying business cycles, however, Minniti and Turino (2013) consider fundamental disturbances only. 2 Relating to endogenous ‡uctuations, Jaimovich (2007) demonstrates how procyclical net business formation can lead to indeterminacy via the generation of countercyclical markups. Pavlov and Weder (2012) investigate the role of variety e¤ects in generating sunspot equilibria. Both of these papers feature mono-product …rms and hence do not consider …rms' product scope choices. Furthermore, while most of the indeterminacy literature simulates calibrated models by sunspot shocks only, we use Bayesian methods to estimate the indeterminate model with both sunspots and fundamental disturbances to preferences and technology. By and large, we follow estimation approaches put forward by Farmer, Khramov, and Nicolò (2014) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) . 3 Our …ndings suggest that about a third of U.S. output ‡uctuations are related to sunspots events.
The remainder of this paper evolves as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 analyzes the local dynamics. Variable capital utilization is added to the economy in Section 4. The indeterminate model is estimated and simulated in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Model
The economy consists of intermediate good …rms who are large relative to the size of the market and are able to choose how many products to produce. These goods are di¤erentiated and hence bring about market power for these …rms. The commodities are bought by competitive …rms that weld them together into the …nal good that can be consumed or, by adding it to the capital stock, invested. People own the two factors of production and rent out their respective services on competitive markets.
Final goods
Final output, Y t , is produced under perfect competition using the range of intermediate inputs supplied by M t multi-product …rms indexed i. Each …rm supplies N t (i) varieties of goods. Accordingly, the …nal good is constructed via two nested CES aggregators. The …rst encompasses the varieties from an individual …rm i that, when put together, compose
Here y t (i; j) is the amount of the unique intermediate good j produced by …rm i. Parameters and stand for the intra-…rm variety e¤ect and the elasticity of substitution between goods, respectively. The …rm-composite goods are then stacked together to yield the …nal output
Here, ! is the inter-…rm variety e¤ect and is the elasticity of substitution between the …rms'composite goods. Variety e¤ects are separated from the elasticity of substitution as there is no a priori reason for a strong link between them. 4 Moreover, the separation allows us to clearly distinguish the variety e¤ect and its impacts from that of imperfect competition. As we will see later, the intra-…rm variety e¤ect is crucial for …rms to produce more than a single product. Feenstra and Ma (2009) develop a related framework in which they assume = . However, Broda and Weinstein's (2010) work suggests that these parameters are not equal, accordingly we will also calibrate the model following their …ndings.
The pro…t maximization problem yields
where
4 Benassy (1996) .
is the price index for …rm i's goods and the aggregate price index satis…es
In words, the demand for each variety depends negatively on its price, positively on the aggregate price index P t , and positively (negatively) on the …rm price index P t (i) if > ( < ).
Intermediate good …rms
Each intermediate …rm chooses how many di¤erent products it brings to the market and at what price it sells them. These tasks are solved in two stages. In the …rst, product scopes are decided. During the second stage, …rms set their pricing rules by acting as Bertrand competitors in the product market. 5 Each period, the number of active …rms is determined by a zero pro…t condition.
Intermediate goods are produced using capital, k t (i; j), and labor, h t (i; j), that are supplied on perfectly competitive factor markets. The production technology is Cobb-Douglas and involves two …xed costs. The variety-level …xed cost, , applies once a variety is added to the production line. It restricts the amount of varieties a …rm will produce and at the same time implies that it is only pro…table to produce multiple products if the intra-…rm variety e¤ect is operating. The …rm-level …xed cost, f , provides economies of scope. It determines the number of active …rms via a zero-pro…t condition. Hence, a …rm's output is given by
(6) Each …rm sets prices to maximizes pro…ts
where w t and r t are the labor and capital rental rates. Following Yang and Heijdra (1993), intermediate good …rms are large enough to take the aggregate price index into consideration when making their pricing decision. 6 Appendix A.2 shows that a …rm charges the same price, p t (i), for all of its varieties. Then, the optimal markup, t (i) = p t (i)=mc t becomes
where mc t is the marginal cost of producing an additional variety, and t (i) is …rm i's market share:
which increases in the number of goods N t (i). This highlights the importance of the intra-…rm variety e¤ect, . Without it, the market share would not depend on the product scope. Pro…ts would be decreasing in N t (i) because of the variety-level …xed cost and hence, …rms would only produce a single product. Firms determine their optimal number of products by maximizing pro…ts with respect to N t (i) by taking into account the e¤ect on its own and other …rms'pricing decisions (see Appendix A.3). The …rst-order condition is
which can be understood as follows. The …rst term on the left-hand side corresponds to the presence of the intra-…rm variety e¤ect: introducing a new product increases the …rm's market share and its pro…ts. The second term stands for the impact of product scope on the aggregate price index. Speci…cally, a higher product scope reduces the aggregate price index, @P t =@N t (i) < 0, which from (3) leads to a lower demand for …rm i's products. The right-hand side of (8) represents the cost of producing one additional variety.
Symmetric equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, each …rm produces the same number of varieties, N t (i) = N t , charges the same price, p t (i) = p t , and has the same market share t (i) = 1=M t . Let us designate the …nal good to be the numeraire, P t = 1, and therefore from (4) and (5), the price of a variety is determined by the two variety e¤ects:
Using the above, (1) and (2), output per variety is
The markup simpli…es to
which decreases with …rm entry. It is this mechanism that renders the markup countercyclical. Furthermore, an increase in the …rm's product scope raises its own price and reduces the prices of other …rms: to lower price competition, …rms under-expand their product scopes in comparison to the case of monopolistic competition where such strategic linkages are absent. The extent of this under-expansion can be seen by substituting @ t (i)=@N t (i) and @P t =@N t (i) into (8) and rearranging:
The term in the square brackets is less than one and is increasing in M t : the strategic e¤ect of the product scope decision becomes less important as the number of …rms increases and this gives an incentive to introduce new varieties. When M t becomes very large this term approaches unity and the markup converges to its monopolistic competition level of =( 1). Intuitively, as the number of …rms grows, the impact on the market share of adding an additional variety becomes smaller, which has then a less impact on the price of the variety. Further rearrangement yields the product scope
Using (6), (9) and the zero pro…t condition determines M t as
To obtain aggregate output, we substitute (6) in (9), and use (11) to simplify:
where p t = t is an endogenous e¢ ciency wedge that arises in the absense of changes to fundamentals. Finally, the equilibrium real wage and rental rate are given by
People
There is a nonatomic measure-one space of agents. We assume that the individuals' preferences depend on consumption and leisure and that they can be represented by a utility function of the form
Here, denotes the subjective rate of time preference and period utility, u(:; :), is separable in consumption, C t , and hours worked, H t . It takes on the functional form
where is the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Logarithmic utility is the only additive-separable form consistent with balanced growth. The agents own the capital stock and sell labor as well as capital services. Any generated pro…ts, t , ‡ow back to them. Let X t denote investment, then the period budget is constrained by
where investment is added to the capital stock such that:
Time derivatives are denoted by dots and stands for the constant rate of physical depreciation of the capital stock. The solution to the maximization problem entails
and
Equation (13) describes the agents'leisure-consumption trade-o¤, while (14) is the intertemporal Euler equation. In addition the transversality condition must hold.
Dynamics
This section analyzes the local dynamical properties of various versions of the arti…cial economy. To do so, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions and arrange the dynamical system to
Hatted variables denote percent deviations from their steady-state values and J is the 2 2 Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives. Note that C t is a non-predetermined variable and that K t is predetermined. Indeterminacy means that the number of stable eigenvalues of J exceeds the number of predetermined variables. In the present model, for indeterminacy both roots of J must be negative, i.e. DetJ > 0 >TrJ. For numerical explorations, we calibrate standard parameters at a quarterly frequency as = 0:3, = 0:01, = 0:025 and = 0 which is set in line with most studies of indeterminacy to make a comparison straightforward.
Mono-product model
To better illustrate the contribution of the …rms'product scope decisions on indeterminacy, we …rst consider the case of mono-product …rms. Figure 1 presents the stability zones, assuming that the variety e¤ect depends on the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods: ! = 1= ( 1) . The …gure indicates that we prohibit situations where < =( 1) to rule out M < 0. As can be seen, the minimum steady state markup allowing for indeterminacy is = 1=(1 ) = 1:429, which implies a variety e¤ect at 1=( 1) = 0:429. This exactly corresponds to the result reported in Pavlov and Weder (2012) for a mono-product model with monopolistic competition. Now, as approaches =( 1), the number of …rms approaches in…nity: the markup and local dynamics converge to the case of monopolistic competition. This implies via (10) that the minimum needed for generating indeterminacy is not lower under oligopolistic competition. On the other hand, Figure 1 also shows that the required variety e¤ect drops considerably with higher values of : This is because greater substitutability between differentiated goods (and hence a lower variety e¤ect) and/or a higher steady state markup imply a lower number of …rms and a more elastic markup over the business cycle. Therefore, the dashed stability line in the …gure is upwardly sloping because the lower variety e¤ect (via higher ) needs to be o¤set by a higher markup elasticity (via higher ). Yet, the line eventually becomes downwardly sloping because the gain from the higher markup elasticity starts to dominate the in ‡uence of the lower variety e¤ect on the endogenous e¢ ciency wedge as goods become closer substitutes. Figure 2 presents the numerical indeterminacy region for the multi-product model. 7 We set ! = = 1=( 1) = 1=( 1) to allow for multi-product …rms. Once again, the model converges to the one with monopolistic competition along the = =( 1) line. This is because the equality implies that both the markups and the product scopes are constant over the business cycle (see Appendix A.4). Under oligopolistic competition, however, the entry of new competitors reduces existing …rms'market shares and encourages them to expand their product scopes. This additional channel of product creation reduces the minimum steady state markup, for example, for elasticities of substitution at = = 14, a markup of = 1:3 is enough for indeterminacy. 8 At this point, the variety e¤ect is only ! = = 0:077 compared to the required size of 0:429 under monopolistic competition. Phrased alternatively, the complementarity feature of oligopolistic markets and endogenous product choice makes sunspot equilibria much easier to obtain. 9 
Multi-product model

Capital utilization
The last section has demonstrated that when …rms are able to choose their product scopes the possibility of sunspot equilibria increases. Next, it is shown that levels of market power can be reduced even further by augmenting the multi-product model by variable capital utilization. Each intermediate good …rm i now operates the production technology
where U t stands for the utilization rate of capital set by its owners. Capital accumulation follows In the symmetric equilibrium, the aggregate production function is
and the optimal rate of capital utilization entails
The calibration remains as in the previous section and % = ( + )= = 1:4 follows from steady state …rst-order conditions. 10 Then, Figure 3 demonstrates how the introduction of variable capital utilization signi…cantly reduces the level of market power and the elasticities of substitution that are required for indeterminacy. In particular, the minimum steady state markup falls below 1.1. This occurs because, like lower markups and higher product variety, higher utilization increases the demand for labor. Moreover, given the above combination of and values, for a positive M the steady state markup must be = 1:154 = 7:5=(7:5 1) or higher. Yet, at that value, the economy is in a sunspot equilibrium. 11 We conclude that sunspot equilibria are well in line with what could be considered a empirically reasonable calibration.
To further gain understanding about the e¤ect of sunspots, the impulse responses of various variables are plotted in Figure 5 -on impact, the sunspot shock moves output 1 percent above its steady state. The calibration of the discrete-time version of the economy involves = 0:3, = 0:025, = 0, a discount factor at (1 + ) 1 = 0:99 and Broda and Weinstein's (2010) 11 Changing the steady state markup leaves the sunspots zone basically unchanged while the = =( 1) line shifts up or down. See Figure A2 . suggestion that = 7:5 and = 11:5. Additionally, the steady state markup is set equal to 1.3 (the next section contains justi…cation for this assumption). The impulse response functions reveal that both net product creation and net business formation positively comove with output, with the former being more volatile than the latter. It can also be seen that output per variety is countercyclical. This is due to the cannibalization e¤ect: an introduction of a new variety reduces the demand for existing varieties. The markup ‡uctuates countercyclically. These combined e¤ects lead to an upwardly sloped wagehours locus which gives way to the self-ful…lling sunspots mechanism outlined earlier.
Estimation and simulations
We have shown that intra-…rm product creation can generate indeterminacy under very plausible situations. Although this can be considered as progress, it would be rendered void if the model is unable to replicate the basic business cycle facts. This is done next by using U.S. quarterly data to estimate the indeterminate model and then comparing simulation results with a set of moments that characterize U.S. aggregate ‡uctuations (see Appendix A.5 for the data sources).
The model
The model employed here is a discrete time economy with capital utilization -parametric sunspot zones are roughly identical to the continuous time variant of the arti…cial economy. We furthermore add fundamental aggregate supply and demand shocks to the economy. The …rst source of fundamental uncertainty, labor augmenting technological progress, A t , a¤ects all …rms equally and implies that aggregate output is given by a version of (12):
It is non-stationary and follows the process
Here ln g is the average growth rate and " 12 The second fundamental disturbance is a preference shock to the agent's utility of consumption -a stand-in for aggregate demand shocks. Period utility now takes the form u(C t ; H t ) = ln(C t t )
1 + where a positive shock to t increases the marginal utility of consumption that leads to an urge to consume as in Baxter and King (1992) or Weder (2006) . It follows the process
with the shock variance 2 : In the model, this shock drives the economy's labor wedge, i.e. the gap between the marginal rate of consumption-leisure substitution and the marginal product of labor. Hence, our estimation will allow a much wider interpretation than mere shocks to preferences -a more agnostic reading would include changes to monetary policy for example.
It is now well known that under indeterminacy, the economy's response to shocks is not uniquely determined and that sunspots propagate fundamental disturbances (see Schorfheide, 2003 and 2004) . We follow Farmer, Khramov, and Nicolò (2014) in dealing with such loose expectation errors. Speci…cally, we reclassify the expectation error to output, Y t , as a new exogenous shock:
Understanding that fundamental shocks have an e¤ect on output on impact, we go a step further by breaking down the expectation error into fundamental and non-fundamental components:
where the parameters A and determine the e¤ect of technology and preferences shocks on output and " s t is an i.i.d. sunspot shock that is independent of fundamentals with variance 2 s . 12 Since A t displays a stochastic trend, the model is then detrended. For example, detrended output is given byỸ t = Y t =A t andŶ t = lnỸ t lnỸ ; whereỸ is the steady state value. 13 Our results are robust to the choice of expectation error.
Estimation
The model is estimated via Bayesian methods using the quarterly real per capita growth rates of output, consumption, investment and the logarithm of per capita hours worked from 1948:I-2012:IV as observables. 14 The measurement equation is thus where "
m:e: t is a measurement error restricted to account for not more than ten percent of output growth.
The parameters that are calibrated remain the same as in the previous sections:
= 0:3; = 0:025; = 0, = 0:99, = 7:5, and = 11:5. Furthermore, the quarterly growth rate of per capita real GDP implies that the growth rate of labor augmenting technological progress is ln g = 0:0046.
The remaining parameters are estimated using the stochastic arti…cial economy in log-linear form. These parameters are the steady state markup, , the parameters that portray the stochastic processes, i.e. A , , s , A , , A , and a measurement error m:e: . We follow Christiano, Trabandt, and Walentin (2011) by using endogenous priors to prevent overly high estimated model variances. Table 1 presents the initial prior and posterior distributions for the estimated parameters. We assume a gamma distribution for with a lower limit of 1.154 to keep the steady state number of …rms strictly positive, i.e. M > 0. The mean is centered around the middle of value-added markup estimates for the U.S. (see Jaimovich, 2007) . A wide uniform distribution is employed for the expectation error parameters A and . The other parameters follow quite standard calibrations, hence, we refrain from expounding on these. We use the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to obtain 500,000 draws from the posterior mean and adjust the scale in the jumping distribution to achieve a 30 percent acceptance rate.
As can be seen from the table, all estimated parameters are relatively precise as revealed by the percentiles. The estimated markup is well inside the empirically plausible range. High persistence is found for preference shocks while the persistence of the shock to the growth rate of technology is close to zero. The signs of A and are as expected since detrended output also falls (rises) in response to permanent technology (demand) shocks in the determinate version of this economy as well as in a plain-vanilla RBC model. 15 Table 2 shows that the model …ts the data well. The table presents the second moments of the U.S. data and of the estimated arti…cial economy. The model slightly overpredicts the variance of the growth rates but does a better job at matching the variances of the Hodrick Prescott (HP) …ltered series. The relative volatilities as well as the co-movements of the main macroeconomic variables line up with data. Furthermore, as can be seen by the autocorrelation functions (ACF), the rich internal propagation mechanism of the indeterminate model produces persistence in the growth rates without having to rely on various real frictions used in the literature. The relative contribution of each of the three shocks to output, consumption, investment and hours worked is displayed via a variance decomposition (Table 3) . When considering growth rates, the decomposition suggests that output ‡uctuations are caused by an about equal split between the three disturbances. Investment appears to be mainly driven by sunspots and movements in consumption are largely caused by demand and technology shocks. The importance of sunspots remains largely unchanged when the series are HP …ltered. However, the role of technology shocks slightly diminishes as demand shocks now explain most of consumption ‡uctuations. 
Robustness
To demonstrate the robustness of the above insights, we next put forward two alternative models. Model 2 picks the forecast error on consumption (instead of output) as the exogenous sunspot shock, C t . As before, it is split into fundamental and non-fundamental components. In Model 3 we follow the approach of Farmer, Khramov, and Nicolò (2014). Here, the sunspot shock is simply the forecast error, i.e. Intuitively, since output is forward looking, this expectation error should be correlated with fundamental shocks. Yet, it is also a sunspot shock as it can cause movements in economic activity without any shifts to fundamentals. Assuming a uniform distribution, we thus estimate the correlations between Y t and the fundamental shocks, " A t and " t . The priors for the other parameters are kept the same as in the baseline model. As can be seen in Table 4 , and this echoes the …ndings of Farmer, Khramov, and Nicolò (2014), our estimation results are robust to the choice and formation of the expectation error. 
Conclusion
Previous studies have shown that procyclical product creation via entry and exit of mono-product …rms can be an important source of sunspot equilibria. Yet, recent empirical evidence suggests that product creation occurs largely within existing …rms. Motivated by these …ndings, the current paper investigates the role of intra-…rm product scope adjustments in a general equilibrium economy with oligopolistic producers. It shows that the multiproduct nature of …rms makes the economy signi…cantly more susceptible to sunspot equilibria. The estimated indeterminate model driven by both belief and fundamental disturbances generates arti…cial business cycles that closely resemble empirically observed ‡uctuations. Our study elucidates that sunspots cause a non-negliable portion of the U.S. business cycle.
From (4)
Then from (5)
Then the price elasticity of demand is
Note that under monopolistic competition, …rms are too small to in ‡uence the aggregate price index, P t ; and hence the last term in (A.1) would be absent.
A.2 Markups
This Appendix derives the optimal markups of intermediate good …rms. Firm i maximizes pro…t (7) subject to the constraint (6):
Optimality gives
The Lagrange multiplier, t ; is obtained by combining (A.3) and (A.4) and amounts to the marginal cost, mc t , of producing one more variety:
Hence, the costs of production are
and pro…ts are
Substituting (A.1) into (A.2) and some algebra yields
Substituting (3) for y t (i; j), the above equation simpli…es to
As the second part of this equation is the same for all j 2 [0; N t (i)]; this implies that …rm i will charge the same price for all of its varieties. Hence, p t (i; j) = p t (i; k) = p t (i) and the equation simpli…es to
To solve for …rm i's markup, …rst note from (4) that P t (i) = N t (i) p t (i): Then using this together with (1), (3) and (5), we can express …rm i's market share,
As long as > 0; the price index P t (i) is decreasing in N t (i); and so increasing the product scope increases the …rm's market share. Finally, the markup, t (i) p t (i)=mc t , can be found by rearranging (A.6):
A.3 Product scope
This Appendix derives the …rms' optimal product scope. Substituting (3) into (A.5), then using (4) and (A.7), we rewrite pro…ts as
Firm i takes the number of …rms and their product scopes as given and maximizes its pro…ts with respect to N t (i) by taking account the e¤ect of its product scope decision on its own and all other producers'pricing decisions. The …rst-order condition is
(A.9) We now calculate @ t (i)=@N t (i) and @P t =@N t (i) and then substitute in (A.9) to obtain …rm i's product scope. Di¤erentiating (A.7) with respect to N t (i) yields
: (A.10)
Note that the second term on the right hand side of (A.10) would not be present in the case of monopolistic competition. As we will see, @p t (i)=@N t (i) and @P t =@N t (i) are positive and negative, respectively; implying that …rms contract their product scopes compared to the case of monopolistic competition. We rewrite the aggregate price index (5) as
Then, after some algebra @P t =@N t (i) can be expressed as
(A.11) We now show that the …rst term in the square brackets is equal to zero. From (A.8)
Di¤erentiating with respect to N t (i) 
A.4 Monopolistic competition
This Appendix shows that under monopolistic competition, markups and the product scope are constant over the business cycle. Moreover, this implies that the local dynamics and conditions for indeterminacy are identical to the mono-product model described in Pavlov and Weder (2012) . The procedure is similar to that used in the previous appendices. When …rms are too small to in ‡uence the aggregate price index, P t ; the price elasticity of demand becomes @ ln y t (i; k) @ ln p t (i; j) = |{z} absent for k6 =j ( ) p t (i; j) P t (i)
Substituting it in (A.2) and some algebra gives a constant markup
In determining the product scope, di¤erentiating pro…t by N t (i) leads to the …rst order condition
and hence
Substituting N t in …rm i's pro…ts, t (i) = 0; and solving for M t gives
Finally, combining the last two equations yields:
Since the markup and the product scope are constant over the business cycle, the linearized model is identical to the constant markup mono-product model presented in Pavlov and Weder (2012) .
A. Figure A3 : Impulse responses to a permanent techonology shock (percent deviations from the balanced growth path).
